Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1950

Kennecott Copper Corporation and Bingham and
Garfield Railway Company v. State Tax
Commission : Plaintiffs' Reply to Brief of
Defendant in Answer to Plaintiffs' Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
C. C. Parsons; Wm. M. McCrea; A. D. Moffat; Calvin A. Behle; Attorneys for Plaintiffs;
Recommended Citation
Reply to Response to Petition for Rehearing, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm., No. 7298 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1065

This Reply to Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7298.
Case No. 7298

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

KENNECOT'T COPPER oCORPORATION, a corporation, and
BINGHAM AND GARFIELD
RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation,
PlJaimtiffsI
vs.

STATE TAX OOMMISSION,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION ~OR
REHEARING

'F I L E. ~J...AvM.c.

pARSONS.,
M. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
DEC 2 0 1950
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
-----------···-·····.. Attorneys f.or Plaitntif!s.

a;k":s~;~e eourt, utah

PIIITED
U. LFunding
A.-JOE
R. BROWIprovided
PTG. CO.,
LAICI
CITYand Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law II
Library.
for digitization
by theSALT
Institute
of Museum
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT

1-3

-

I.
Point.
Defendant's discussion of the relation of Federal
statutes to depletion calculation under the
Ut" h Corporation Franchise Tax Act is nei. factual nor forthright; again consisty it is a part of this defendant's plan
onfuse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-11

II.
Point.
This defendant proceeds further in the course
of its plan to confuse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-14

STATUTES:
Laws of Utah, 1931, c. 39,
Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-7

Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, 45 Stat. 791-883,
26 U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Acts 1924
to date, p. 345,
Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6, 11

Regulation 7 4, Article 221 (h),
Cited...................................
Quoted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7
7-8

Revenue Act of 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169-289,
26 U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Acts 1924
to date, p. 477,
Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Regulation 77, Article 221 (g),
Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

turbeJ by the opinion of the Court on the issues
so far presented to the Court for determination,
we venture to suggest that Kenneeott 's worst
fears are still to be realized."
That prophecy is delivered with shocking presumption, assurance and effrontery. ''Our worst fears'' were
those that the Court simply did not understand what
this case was about. Now we are confidently assured
by counsel that we must not expect the Court to understand what this case is about, which naturally defendant
concludes will inure to defendant's benefit and that there
is nothing we can do about it.
We have not despaired of this Court's purpose to
be advised of what this case is about, notwithstanding
this defendant's very consistent effort to confuse.
Counsel strut naively, but if we are to be led to the
slaughter, we prefer, and we think it our right, to have
our case presented and considered by this Court upon
all issues and on a record ·wherein all issues shall have
been raised and tried.
Counsel's conclusion to Defendant's Brief in Answer
to Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing is nothing more
than a boastful threat of what this defendant is going
to do to plaintiff upon the trial of other issues not here
but hereafter to be raised. The impropriety of the dissertation contained within this so-called conclusion will
be apparent, but we think this case is of sufficient seriousness to warrant thorough understanding before decision. We suggest that the only course to be taken in
fairness to this plaintiff, to the Court and to all others
2
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concenwd will be the recall of the opinion rendered;
and after correction when the Court shall have fully
considered the limited issues presently before it, the
remand of the case to the defendant without encun1brance
and with instructions to embrace within the proper
con1pass of the proceeding all issues properly to be
raised therein and to try the case upon those issues.
Upon the record so made, a review may he had.
Even the defendant, at pages 20 and 21 of its Brief
1n Answer to Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing, has
stated that it ''deems it most unwise to concede the
validity of any of Kennecott's various 'allocation factors' and 'accounting formulas' unless and until this
Court has spoken,'' when ''this Court will be in the
position where it can see this case as a finished product
in fact and figures for 1942 and all succeeding years.''
The Court should be informed before decision. This
case started out as a friendly suit seeking the Court's
constructive opinion on issues from which it was hoped
and expected by the Commission's then counsel that
S·ettlement would be reached upon others not then before
the Court. This controversy has now reached the point
where there is nothing friendly about it; and this Court's
present opinion is being made the excuse for unprecedented demands beyond the wildest imagination of any
one; and upon which this defendant boasts before this
Court, not only of its purpose but of its uncontrolled
power to exact from tliis plaintiff the very maximum
of its fantastic demands-to say the least a climate not
friendly to great industry, investment and development.
3
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Point.
Defendant's discussion of the relation of Federal
statutes to depletion calculation under the Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act is neither factual nor forthright;
again consiste·ntly it is a part of this defendant's plan to
confuse.

What nons-ense is this. (Defendant's Brief in Answer
to Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing, pages 6 and 7) :
'' Vlhether depletion should be calculated on
the basis of mill concentrates, as the Commission
has concluded, or refined copper, as Kennecott has
con tended, depends on what the Federal law provides. Both Kennecott and the Commission, in
effect, have rested their cases on what the applicable Federal law provides with respect to depletion.''
Let us look at the record.
It was here stipulated that the case might be submitted to the Court on an "agreed record." We quote
from that agreed record as follows:
"1. Section 80-13-8(8) requires the Commission to allow as a deduction 'a reasonable
allowance for depletion and for depreciation of
improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case, such reasonable allowance in
all cases to be made under rules and regulations
to he prescribed by the Tax Commission.' Two
methods for computation of depletion are then
prescribed: ( 1) cost (or value), a method which
l{ennecott has never used (Section 80-13-9 (a)) ;
and ( 2) a percentage formula based upon net
income, which Kennecott has consistently used
(Section 80-13-9 (b) ) .
4
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'' 2. These statutes in respect to the depletion allowance have not been amended, altered
or revised by the legislature since the Corporation Franchi:5e Tax Act was first enacted. The
wording is in part identical with and modeled
after the federal statute.* * *
'' 3. X o rules or regulations have been promulgated by the Co1nn1ission Llnder the foregoing
Section 80-13-8(8) except as hereinafter set forth.
(R. 10-±)

• * •

•• ( 1) In cmnputing 'net income from the
property' to which the percentage of 331fa is to
be applied to cmnpute depletion under the p~r
centage method, at no time sinee the effective date
of the Corporation Franchise Tax Act has (R.
105) Kennecott or any other Utah mining company deducted from gross income any profit
attributable to smelting, refining, transportation
and selling.* * *

"(2) The federal statute, originally the
Inodel for the Utah provisions, was amended by
Congress in 1942 to provide for such an allocation, but on a basis different than that contended
for by the Commission in this case. (I.R.C.
~114(b) ( 4) (B).)
"(3) For ·each year beginning with the
effective date of the Utah Corporation Franchise
Tax Act to and including the corporation franchise tax, instructions and returns for the taxable
year 1942 the tax return forms and instructions
issued by the Commission in accordance with law
provided as follows:
'' 21. DEPLETION. The amount deductible on account of depletion in Iten1 21
in the case of metalliferous, coal and other
hydrocarbon mines, and oil and gas wells,
6
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may be based on ( 1) the cost of the property
with respect to which depletion is claimed, or,
if the property was acquired prior to Janua.ry 1, 1931, on the cost or the fair market
value of the property on January 1, 1931,
whichever is greater, or (2) the net income
from the property during the taxable year
computed without allowance for depletion,
at thirty-three and one-third per cent of such
net income, as the taxpayer may elect. * ~'j: *
(R. 106)

'' ( 4) For the year 1943 the Commission
amended said instructions to read as follows:
• * *
''Net incmne from the property as a basis
for the percentage limitations must be computed by deducting from gross income from
the property all deduction allowed by statute
in com·puting taxable net income (excluding
any allowance for depletion) to the extent
that they are applicable to the property. The
requisite deductions shall include overhead
and operating expenses, development costs
properly charged to expense, depreciation,
taxes including Federal income taxes, losses
sustained, etc. In cases where the taxpayer
engages in actiYities in addition to, or derives income from sources other than, mineral extraction, deductions not directly attributable to any particular activity or source
of income shall be fairly allocated. * * * "
(R. 107.)

Let us now observe the sequence In which these
statutory enactments occurred.
The Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act (Laws
6
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'l~

H)31. e. 39) was passed :March 12, 1931, approved :March
20, 1931, e:ffeetive l\Iay 1:2, 1931, and provided that "the
first taxable year shall be the calendar year 1931 or any
fiscal year ending during the calendar year 1931.''
The Federal law which was in effect in 1931 was
the Revenue Act of 1928 ( Aet. of ~Iay 29, 1928, c. 852,
-!3 Stat. 791-883, 26 U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Acts 1924
to date, p. 345) and this applied to the taxable year 1928
and succeeding taxable years 1929, 1930 and 1931. It
provided for a reasonable allowance for depletion,
according to the peculiar conditions in each case.
Percentage depletion in case of mines was not allowed.
Such depletion calculated for all mines discovered prior
to February 28, 1913, was permitted only on the basis
of cost or fair market value as of March 1, 1913, whichever was greater. In the case of mines discovered after
February 28, 1913, the basis for depletion was fair market value at date of discovery-not to exceed 50 per cent
of "net income of the taxpayer (computed without allowance for depletion) from the property upon which the
discovery was made.''
Under the Act of 1928 Regulation 74 was issued,
Article 221(h) of which provided in part that "The
phrase 'Net Income of the taxpayer (computed without
allowance for depletion)' means the gross income from
the sale of all mineral products from the discovery ore
body less the deductions in respect to the property upon
which the discovery is made, including overhead and
operating expenses, depreciation, taxes, losses sustained,
etc., but excluding any allowance for depletion. If the
7
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mineral ·products are not sold as raw material but are
manufactured or converted into a refined product, the
gross income shall be assumed to be equivalent to the
market or field price of the raw material before conversion • * • ".
The "market or field price of the raw material before conversion'' could not exceed of eourse the ultimate
sales price of the first commercially marketable product
less all costs back to the raw material, the same principle
applying as that applicable to mine evaluation discussed
by us in Point I of Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing at
page 15 et seq.
The language of that part of the Revenue Act of
19:12 (Act. of June 6, 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169-289, 26
U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Acts 1924 to date, p. 477 et
seq) relevant to the controversy presently before this
Court remained unchanged until passage on F·ebruary
2:), 1944 of the Revenue Act of 1943 (58 Stat. 21, 26
U.S.C.A. 114(b) ( 4) (B)). Percentage depletion in the
case of mines was allowed for the first time by the
Revenue Act of 1932; the allowance was 15 per cent of
the ''gross income from the property,'' not to ''exceed
50 per cent of the net income of the taxpayer (computed
without allowance for depletion) from the property."
Neither gross nor net income was defined by any Act of
Congress until passage of the Revenue Act of 1943 on
February 25, 1944. By Regulation 77, Article 221(g),
promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1932, it was provided that cost of processes beyond concentrating were
required to be deducted. No mention of profit as attrib8
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utahle to any processes preceding sale of the first eommereially 1narketable product occurs in any Federal act.
The basis behind Federal percentage depletion is the
one stated by lTnder-Secretary Paul at the tim·e the
Bureau was pressing for allocation of profits to the
processes beyond concentration. At that time .JJ r. Paul
stated that the whole purpose of the attributable profits
provision in the regulations was to bring the large producer who performs processing beyond the concentrating
stage on a par with the small producer who customarily
sold his product to the sm·elter ( R. 69). As Kennecott
deducts from the amount received for the sale of its
product the amount charged by those who perforn1 the
smelting, transportation, and refining, that charge includes the profit of those engaged in the processes beyond
concentration, and those making that profit would be
taxed by the several states wherein that profit was
earned ( R. 66).
It is of course the practice of custom smelters in
purchasing ores from independent producers to charge
not only the actual cost of smelting, but a profit, and,
likewise, the same situation -exists with respect to transportation and refining. Having arrived at the cost of
these operations and having determined the amount of
profit which it wishes to make in peTforming this work,
the smelter then deducts from the market or sales price
of the metals contained in the ore purchased, the total of
of these costs and profiits and the result is the price
the smelter will pay for ore purchased.

9
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In Kennecott's case precisely that situation exists.
The only difference is that Kennecott retains ownership
in the metals, which it sells or has sold for it, and from
the price received it deducts the amount charged for
smelting, freight and refining, which deduction includes
all the profit earned through the rendition of those services. Accordingly the amount upon which depletion is
calculated in Kennecott's case is on precisely the same
basis as is all ore purchased by the smelter from independent producers.
The only profit earned having been once deducted,
will this Court approve a second deduction as profit,
which is not profit at all, of some amount arbitrarily
assessed by this defendant. If so, by what authority
and why1 The elimination from Kennecott's net income
of this second deduction, which is not profit and which
is not attributable at all to Kennecott's operation, could
be nothing more than an arbitrary seizure, without rhyme
or reason, of a part of Kennecott's net income for no
purpose whatever except the arbitrary reduction of
Kennecott's depletion factor and the resulting palpable
discrimination against Kennecott. As quoted on page
23 of Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing, where Kennecott its·elf has engaged in the processing of its production beyond the concentrating stage, the Federal government has allocated profit to those operations, but
otherwise it certainly has not, and this is exactly in line
with the Federal regulations and the practice of the
Internal Revenue Department.

10
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The effort of this defendant to assig-n profit to these
processes where they have not been performed by the
taxpayer and where the only profit earned has already
once been deducted as part of the cost, is contrary to
the practice of the Internal Revenue Department itself
and is without precedent or authority whatsoever. \Ve
know of no plainer case of adnlinistrative asstunption of
legislative powers. X ow by its own statements defendant
is caught red-handed, invoking a non-existent law in an
attempt to confuse this Court into endorsement of the
changes defendant proposes without legislative sanction
and contrary to administrative practice.

It must be thoroughly understood by this defendant, and now evident to this Court, that the Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act, passed March 12, 1931,
could not h~ve been ''modeled'' after any Act of Congress other than the Rev-enue Act of 1928. One will
search that Act and all practices thereunder in vain
for even the remotest thought of allocating to smelting,
transportation, refining and sales, or any of those se'rvic.es, any item of profit. Congress attempted nothing of
that kind by the Revenue Act of 1928, nor did the Utah
legislature have even remotely in mind any such fantastic effort. The Utah Act passed .March 12, 1931,
could not have been "modeled" after an Act of Congress
not then in existence.

11
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n.
Point.
This defendant proceeds further in the course of its
plan to confuse.
On page 4 of Defendant'~ Brief in Answer to Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing it is stated that Kennecott
did certain things in connection with the production of
cop'P'er from its propeTty at Bingham. It is important
that it be dearly understood that, of the processes
enumerated, Kennecott mined and milled the ore. The
s1nelting, transportation and refining was done by others
for Kennecott; and the selling was by a subsidiary of
Kennecott, all profit by reason of sales being meticulously
eliminated. The entire profit of the operation is re'alized
only when the copper is sold. Kennecott does not engage
in fabricating or manufacturing. Part of its production
after sale as copper, is fabricated or manufactured into
other forms by its suhsidiaries, Kennecott Wire and
Cable and Chase ·Copper and Brass. All copper is sold
either in the open n1arket or at the going market price.
As none of the product is sold before the copper is refined, any computation of amount received must of
necessity start with the refined product. Not only is that
true in our immediate problem, but as well and equally
of necessity in computing the value of mines for any
purpose. The sales price for metal production must be
the point from which all calculations are made whereby
to arrive at value.
We question that even this defendant can understand that paragraph in the middle of page 13 of its

12
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brief wherein it is stated that defendant's fonnula works
in Kennecott's favor by attributing too much net incmne
to the activities defendant chooses to denominate •'postmining.'' The reverse of course must be true on defendant's theory, for if upon that theory too much profit
were attributed to those activities the depletion allowable to Kennecott would be correspondingly reduced.
On the bottom of page 14 and top of page 15 of
defendant's brief reference is made to iron ore. The
Federal regulations provide specifically that where there
is such a field price thrut will be the basis for calculating
the amount of depletion allowable instead of taking the
sale of the finished product and deducting the costs or
pro~esses beyond the concentrating stage. Iron ore in
that industry is the first commel'cially Inarketable product.
We must observe that the allocation factor of ·66.~)26
referred to by defendant on page 20 of its Answer to
Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing as "Kennecott's 'allocation factor' ", is no nwre Kennecott's factor than it
is that of this defendant. That was the allocation factor
to which defendant and this plaintiff agreed as part of
their settlement of _jfay 27, 1942, and as such applied the
same in the franchise tax computations for the years
1934 to 1941, both inclusive. In harmony with that s·ettlement the allocation factor was used by Kennecott
for the purpose of its fra~chise tax returns for each the
years 1942 et seq. Repudiating the principles adopted
by the settlement of May 27, 1942, this defendant by
letter of March 10, 1945 embarked upon a course of
18
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redetennination, of which the present controversy is an
incident. (R. 103).
On the bottom of page 15 some high sounding language is used. The legislature has not been generous
to any extent. Depletion is an inescapable loss and must
be deducted before profit can be determined. The amount
of investment has nothing whatever to do with the total
value subject to depletion; it is value as of January 1,
1931 which is subject to depletion.
This plaintiff seeks no special treatment, but it does
demand that the same ruJ:es be applied to it as are ap~
plied to other mining companies. This plaintiff is entitled to and it must receive the same consideration
accorded by law to those who sell their ores direct to the
smelter.

Respectfully submitted,
C. C. PARSONS,
WM. 11. McCREA,

A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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